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Abstract 
Epistemic trust is crucial for science. The paper aims to identify the kinds of assumptions 
that are involved in epistemic trust as it is required for the successful operation of science as 
a collective epistemic enterprise. The relevant kind of reliance should involve working from 
the assumption that the epistemic endeavors of others are appropriately geared towards the 
truth, but the exact content of this assumption is more difficult to analyze than it might 
appear. The root of the problem is that methodological decisions in science typically 
involve a complex trade-off between the reliability of positive results, the reliability of 
negative results and the investigation’s power (the rate at which it delivers definitive 
results). Which balance between these is the “correct” one can only be determined in light 
of an evaluation of the consequences of all the different possible outcomes of the inquiry. 
What it means for the investigation to be “appropriately geared towards the truth” thus 
depends on certain value judgments. I conclude that in the optimal case, trusting someone 
in her capacity as an information provider also involves a reliance on her having the right 
attitude towards the possible consequences of her epistemic work. 
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1. Introduction 
The expressions “trust” and, more specifically, “epistemic trust” are often used in the social 
epistemology of the sciences. Epistemic trust, it seems, is a particular sort of trust. We may 
trust the scientists who conduct research on venomous snakes to keep the objects of their 
study locked away safely, but that is not what we mean by epistemic trust. To invest 
epistemic trust in someone is to trust her in her capacity as provider of information. What 
exactly this involves will be the subject of this paper. 
The paper’s title of course contains an ambiguity. On the one hand, the division of 
cognitive labor within the sciences requires scientists to regularly invest trust in each 
other’s work. On the other hand, scientists and scientific institutions are also trusted 
providers of information for non-scientists. Policy-makers, legislators, investors and 
activists as well as “ordinary people” in their capacities as citizens or consumers frequently 
rely on the results of science, trusting that these will help them make well-informed 
decisions. I will begin by focusing on the first kind of epistemic trust in science—the trust 
within science that keeps the fabric of the social enterprise of research together. However, I 
will return to the kind of trust that science receives “from without” at a later point. 
In my approach to the phenomenon at issue, I will make use of a distinction between 
trust and reliance that is common in ethics. As Annette Baier (1986) has pointed out, the 
expressions are not synonymous. While trusting someone to do something is necessarily a 
way of relying on her to do it, the reverse is not true—trusting is a special kind of relying. 
Take the example of an undercover police officer following a kidnapper after the handover 
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of the ransom, relying on the criminal to lead him to the place where the hostages are 
hidden. In this case, it would be an unsuitable use of the word to say that the officer trusts 
the kidnapper to lead him to the hostages. To rely on person P to do A means to work the 
assumption that P does A into one’s plans and decisions. To trust P to do A involves more. 
In Baier’s own analysis, trusting is the kind of relying that makes the trusting person 
dependent on P’s good will. In trusting you to take care of my belongings, for example, I do 
not work merely from the assumption that you will do so, but rather specifically from the 
assumption that you will do so because you are somehow well-disposed towards me. 
(While Baier deserves most of the credit for alerting philosophers to the difference between 
trust and reliance, it should be emphasized that my use of the distinction in this paper is 
strongly influenced by Richard Holton’s analysis.)1 
I will start from the insight that reliance is a more general phenomenon than trust and 
first attempt an account of epistemic reliance in the sciences. Only later will I try to address 
the question whether mere epistemic reliance is good enough to keep the social fabric of 
science together, or whether this requires genuine epistemic trust.  
2. Epistemic reliance within the sciences 
What exactly does the kind of epistemic reliance that facilitates the collective cognitive 
enterprise called science consist in? In other words, what exactly are the assumptions about 
                                                          
1
 In particular, I follow Holton (1994) in not requiring that the relying person believe that P does A. In my 
attempted escape from the lion’s den I may rely on the rotten rope not to break, even if I cannot summon up 
the confidence to believe that it will not. The same holds for trusting. This is why I speak of “working 
something into one’s plans” (a phrase adapted from Holton) rather than, e.g., “accepting something”. Another 
advantage of not treating epistemic reliance as a decision to believe or “accept” a reported proposition is that 
it avoids the problems of epistemic voluntarism (on which see Williams 1973). 
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their fellow researchers’ performance that scientists need to work into their plans and 
decisions? 
The assumption that other scientists speak truly or even knowledgeably when they 
report their results would certainly be too strong. The way that scientists initially set up 
their research projects may often look as if they were working from the assumption that the 
results they are taking from the published research literature are true, but they are usually 
prepared to take a step back and challenge and test the results of others in the face of 
unexpected experimental results. If my whole behavior in the course of an investigation was 
premised on the assumption that p is true, calling p into question could under no 
circumstances be a result or a step within the investigation. While this may arguably be the 
case for some core assumptions—the ones that play a constitutive role for the paradigm or 
research program to which the investigation belongs—it is not the rule. The assumptions 
about the information that scientists rely on which they work into their plans and decisions 
are usually weaker. And this is certainly how it should be in a well-designed collective 
cognitive endeavor, so that one person’s mistake can be corrected by another’s scrutiny. 
This is not to deny that reliance in the sciences has to do with some sort of confidence that 
epistemic endeavors of others are appropriately geared towards the truth. (To the contrary, 
my analysis of epistemic reliance will incorporate this assumption and is thus compatible 
with the veritistic program in social epistemology.2) But being geared towards the truth is 
certainly not the same as having true results and turns out, as I shall argue, to be 
surprisingly difficult to explicate in a precise manner. 
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 On which see Goldman 1992, 192-197 and 1999, chapters 1-3. 
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Working from the assumption that other scientists are sincere when they 
communicate their findings would be too weak as a basis for epistemic reliance. While 
sincerity is part of what scientists assume about each other, it would not suffice to explain 
how the cognitive division of labor works. In relying on the work of others, scientists 
assume more than just that what the others say they have found is what they actually believe 
to have found. They also assume that their colleagues “know what they are doing”—that 
they have chosen the right methods for the problem, that they have employed them 
skillfully and carefully, that they have drawn their conclusions with due attention to all the 
observations they were able to make in the course of inquiry, and so on. 
An appealing way of summing up all these assumptions might be seen in the concept 
of reliability. After all, it sounds reassuringly tautological to state that epistemic reliance in 
the sciences consists in working from the assumption that fellow scientists are reliable 
information providers. Taking my clue from the reliabilist approach in epistemology 
pioneered by Alvin Goldman (1979), I assume that the relevant reliability assumption is 
best understood as a supposition about the objective conditional probability that S is true 
given that one of my peers reports S as a result. In relying on the results of others, scientists 
might be considered to work from the assumption that this probability is “high enough”. 
This way of analyzing epistemic reliance almost automatically brings up the question: 
How high is high enough? As reliability is a matter of degrees, reliance has not been fully 
explicated as working from an assumption about reliability unless we can say something 
about the relevant degree of reliability. This specification could take one of two forms. 
There could be one assumed standard of reliability for all science, i.e. one single threshold 
level x, such that each and every case of epistemic reliance in the sciences consists in 
working from the assumption that a peer’s report is reliable to at least degree x. Or the 
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degree of reliability presupposed in each act of reliance could vary from case to case. In this 
case, the analysis should have something to say about the rationale according to which it 
varies. 
To address the first option, let us consider the question: Could there be a single 
degree of reliability for communicated scientific results that is binding for all of science (or 
at least for a certain scientific discipline or specialty) and due to the objective requirements 
of rationality as they present themselves to the individual researcher? The question needs to 
concern us if we aspire to an analysis of reliance that also leaves some hope for the 
widespread epistemic reliance within the sciences to be by and large justified. For this to be 
the case, the degree of reliability presupposed in epistemic reliance should by and large 
correspond to an actual standard of reliability for communicated scientific results. However, 
philosophers of science have long known an argument that undermines hopes for an 
objectively binding standard of reliability in this sense. The argument was first considered 
by statisticians (Wald 1942, pp. 40-41; Churchman 1948, ch. 15) and brought to the 
attention of philosophers by Richard Rudner (1953); discussion about it has recently been 
revived by Heather Douglas (2000) and others. For the purposes of this paper, I will 
interpret it as an argument to the effect that from an individualistic perspective, there is no 
non-arbitrary way to determine a correct level of reliability that applies across a whole 
range of investigations.3 The “individualistic perspective” in question means that for the 
moment I am abstracting from the need to coordinate cognitive efforts amongst the 
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 The argument has initially been proposed in support of the claim that accepting hypotheses in science 
necessarily presupposes value judgments, but it ipso facto undermines prospects for a value-independent 
reliability standard. I have presented a detailed analysis and assessment of the argument in Wilholt 2009. 
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participants in a collective epistemic enterprise. Incorporating the need for coordination will 
make a difference, to which I will turn in section 3. 
The point of departure for the argument under consideration is the essential 
characteristic of all empirical investigations that the evidence never provides conclusive 
support for any hypothesis. In order to communicate something as the result of an 
investigation, we have to select some level of empirical confirmation and declare it 
sufficient for the investigation at issue. Inductive logic and the science of statistics provide 
no guidance as to the choice of this level. The only facts that are rationally relevant for the 
question are our evaluations of the possible outcomes of the investigation—in particular, 
how good the consequences of a correct outcome and how bad the consequences of an 
erroneous one would be. In Rudner’s words: “How sure we need to be before we accept a 
hypothesis will depend on how serious a mistake would be.” (1953, p. 2) 
How deep this point goes and how exactly it affects questions of reliability can be 
illustrated with the aid of the following Bayesian model. In this model, the only two options 
under a researcher’s consideration are to either communicate S as a result of her empirical 
investigation or not to communicate any result (neither S nor non-S). Let c, e, i and j 
represent the researcher’s evaluations of the four possible outcomes of her decision in terms 
of utilities: 
 S is in fact true S is in fact false 
Communicate S c e 
No result i j 
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In terms of constraints on the researcher’s utilities we are only presupposing that a true 
result be preferred over ignorance (c > i) and ignorance over an error (j > e). The expected 
utilities of the two options are plotted against the probability of S in figure 1. 
 
The figure illustrates that communicating S as a result of the investigation maximizes 
expected utility if and only if the probability of S is t or higher, where t = 1/(1 + (c – i)/(j –
 e)). A rational agent who conducts a finite investigation into the question whether S, 
collecting evidence and updating her subjective probabilities accordingly along the way, 
would therefore communicate S as a result of the investigation if and only if she ends up 
assessing the probability Pr(S) with a value of t or more. 
Let us reflect how this may be related to the (objective) reliability of a positive result 
of the investigation. In order to infer anything at all about this reliability, we will have to 
assume that the agent’s subjective probability assignment at the end of the investigation 
constitutes a good approximation of the objective probability of S given the kind of 
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evidence that was collected.4 But even under that assumption, it would be wrong to 
conclude that the reliability of a positive result would be t. If the “investigation” is of a 
simple sort, where strong evidence is easy to come by (such as counting the books on a 
shelf), the subjective probability assigned by the agent at the end of the investigation is 
likely to be very close to either 1 or 0. Positive results under such circumstances can thus 
only be said to be reliable at least to degree t—the actual reliability is likely to be much 
higher.  
However, the reliability can be expected to be close to t in cases where strong 
evidence is hard to come by and resources for collecting evidence are scarce. We can 
include the aspect of resources into our considerations indirectly, by supposing that the 
researcher collects her evidence stepwise. After each step, she decides whether or not to 
communicate S as a result of her investigation in accordance with the decision matrix 
described. In the event that she settles on “no result”, she then makes another decision (not 
modeled by our matrix) whether or not to invest additional resources to investigate the 
matter further. Assuming that she starts from ignorance (Pr(S) ≈ 0.5) in the first step and 
that strong evidence is difficult to obtain, such that the subjective probability Pr(S) changes 
only slowly over the course of each such iteration, a communicated result will typically 
reflect the fact that the researcher has in the last step arrived at a subjective probability just 
over t. 
What this shows is that, if an investigation is difficult in the sense just described, the 
reliability of its result should be expected to be highly sensitive to whichever utilities are 
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 This assumption is perhaps best understood as the claim that in a long series of investigations into questions 
S1, … , Sn which are similar to the present investigation into S with regard to the evidence collected (and the 
kind of question asked), the results S1, … , Sn tend to be true at a relative frequency corresponding to Pr(S).  
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assigned to its possible outcomes. The one crucial measure, it turns out, is the ratio between 
the intervals c – i and j – e. Interestingly, and just as an aside, this allows us to observe that 
the high degree of reliability which we usually expect from scientific investigations depends 
on an implicit utility structure in which the extent to which a false result is bad news (as 
compared to no result) is much greater than the extent to which a true result is good news 
(as compared to no result).  
It might be objected that in practice, researchers have more finely calibrated options at 
their disposal, such as communicating something as a result that is “strongly suggested by 
the data,” or other ways of qualifying their communication of a result. But including these 
additional options would not change the picture in principle. Each way of qualifying the 
communication of a result just adds another row to the decision matrix. Researchers would 
still have to decide whether their result is well-confirmed enough to count as “strongly 
suggested by the data”, for example, and this can only be done by taking the utilities into 
account.5 
Note that the decision whether or not (and together with which qualifying caveats) to 
communicate S as a result at the end of an investigation is of course not the only choice 
through which the researcher influences the ultimate reliability of her output. In deciding 
whether or not to discard a set of measurements from a particular run of an experiment, or 
how to analyze and interpret a set of data, even in settling the details of the design for a new 
experiment or study she faces a similar kind of choice. In general, whenever a researcher 
has to make a yes-or-no decision that affects the further course of inquiry and influences its 
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 This objection was pressed against me by an anonymous referee for this journal, who was also kind enough 
to suggest another response to it: Another reason why the option of adding qualifications and caveats does not 
change the picture very much is that they are typically not listened to. 
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inherent inductive risk (i.e., the probability of ending up with a false result), the rational 
way to make that decision from a purely individualistic perspective should reflect the 
utilities c, e, i and j.6 If the investigation is a difficult one and the researcher has to 
economize on her resources, she would ideally combine her methodological choices in such 
a way as to aim at a reliability of just over t, or, to put it differently, to limit the inductive 
risk (of a false positive) to just under 1 – t. 
Many of the methodological decisions in question are deeply embedded within the 
research process, and are often not explicitly documented and communicated in each 
individual case. In an example described by Douglas (2000), it is the examination of 
individual slices of rat livers for signs of tumors, and in particular the fashion in which 
researchers deal with the many borderline cases in assessing them, that the inductive risk of 
a toxicological animal experiment critically depends on. Countless small yes-or-no 
decisions may have to be made that are sensitive to an assessment of how sure we need to 
be in order to report a certain result at the end of our inquiry. The fact that most of these are 
typically not communicated is not just a contingency of current publication practices. Some 
methodological decisions, such as those described by Douglas, may involve tacit forms of 
judgment that would be impossible to fully document and communicate even if time and 
space played no role. Moreover, “mere” restrictions of time and space should always be 
taken seriously when it comes to communication. Full documentation of all methodological 
decisions would only make a difference if it was also fully absorbed by the recipients and 
users of the results, which is a practical impossibility. In order to make the division of 
cognitive labor practically feasible, publications must compress information. 
                                                          
6
 The term “inductive risk” was introduced in this sense by Hempel (1965, 91-92). 
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Douglas stresses the point that the values which determine the acceptable inductive 
risk in each case must include social, political and moral values. That conclusion is 
plausible if one regards the utilities c, e, i and j as primarily reflecting the consequences that 
a published research result leads to via its applications.7 But it is not necessary to argue this 
point in order to support the conclusion that interests me here, which is the insight that the 
decisive ratio (c – i)/(j – e) does not have one and the same value for all propositions that 
are investigated by a scientific specialty. This insight follows no matter whether the utilities 
considered are the researcher’s own personal utilities, or ones that reflect a whole research 
community’s collective values, or even an abstracted sort of “cognitive utilities” that 
express only the epistemic (as opposed to political and moral) concerns of the scientific 
community.8 Even if we consider the latter kind of utilities, ignoring for the moment the 
difficulties of separating cognitive from non-cognitive concerns in science (cf. Longino 
1996), the cognitive utility of validating a true proposition depends on a number of features 
specific to that proposition. Science cannot pursue each truth with the same eagerness (cf. 
Kitcher 1993, ch. 4, 2001, ch. 6), and so utilities that express the cognitive relevance of 
validating a proposition must differ from case to case. A proposition’s value for the 
systematic organization of our beliefs, its explanatory power and its potential to lead to 
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 Against this understanding of the situation of methodological choice, Richard Jeffrey (1956) had argued in 
response to Rudner that scientific results often have either more than one or no foreseeable applications and 
that therefore, accepting or rejecting hypotheses cannot belong to the scientist’s job description. Instead, 
Jeffrey suggests that the scientist should just attribute probabilities to hypotheses and leave the decision-
making to politicians and other extra-scientific practitioners. However, as the preceding observations have 
made clear, some yes-or-no decisions are inevitably involved in the practice of science, and the scientists have 
to make them on the basis of some utility function or other. 
8
 On cognitive utilities see Maher (1993). 
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more fruitful research in the future are all features that vary among propositions and lead to 
differing utilities even if only “purely epistemic” concerns are taken into account. Nor can it 
be expected that the “costs” of false positive errors (j – e) will magically stay in fixed 
proportion to the benefits of the respective true results (c – i) and thus make for a constant 
value of t. What is true for cognitive utilities, that their structure must be expected to vary 
from proposition to proposition, a fortiori holds for other kinds of collective or individual 
utilities which only add more factors that can cause variation. The fact that in actual 
practice various scientific methods differ widely in their reliability should be obvious 
enough. The above considerations show that, as long as we restrict ourselves to the 
perspective of the individual researcher and abstract from the need to coordinate epistemic 
efforts among individual agents, one universal standard of reliability for a whole scientific 
specialty or discipline (let alone all of science) would not even make sense as an ideal, 
because such a standard would not do justice to the differing utilities of different scientific 
results. 
The same considerations also reveal a deep problem for the other possibility to 
consider, that the degree of reliance could itself vary from one case to the next, always 
presupposing a degree of reliability that is appropriate for the respective case. As we have 
seen, the methodological decisions that affect reliability often occur deep within the 
research process. They are often not explicitly communicated along with the results. This 
seems to indicate that it should be very difficult to judge the reliability that a given research 
result even aims at. So if epistemic reliance consisted in working from the assumption that 
reported results of others are reliable to a degree which can vary from case to case, that 
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would give rise to serious difficulties in explaining how researchers choose the appropriate 
degree in each individual case of reliance.9 
The problem is complicated by the fact that in many situations, assessing the quality 
of results with regard to one particular research question requires the consideration of more 
than just one type of inductive risk. A scientific investigation into the question whether S 
often also gives rise to the possibility of finding non-S as a result. There are therefore two 
more utilities (in addition to the ones we have already considered) in light of which 
methodological decisions will be made and evaluated: 
 S is in fact true S is in fact false 
Communicate S c e 
No result i j 
Communicate non-S f d 
These additional utilities will directly affect the projected reliability of negative results, 
through their part in determining the acceptable inductive risk u of false negative errors (see 
figure 2).10 (I will reserve the term “false negative” for investigations that result in non-S as 
a communicated result where S is in fact true.11) 
                                                          
9
 Kitcher’s (1993, ch. 8) influential treatment of scientists’ reliance on each others’ results focuses on the 
important problem of how to assess another researcher’s competence to achieve reliable results. The problem I 
present here, of identifying the degree of reliability that other researchers even aim at, should be considered as 
an additional one that adds to the difficulties addressed by Kitcher. 
10
 In analogy to the restrictions already introduced, I am going to assume that d > j  and f < i. I am also going 
to presuppose (here and in the rest of the paper) that (d – j)/(j – e) < (i – f)/(c – i), meaning intuitively that the 
utilities are distributed in such a way that the expected utility function for the “no result” option passes above 
the point where the other two intersect. (This effectively disallows utility distributions which would motivate a 
rational researcher to design an investigation that always comes up with either a positive or a negative result 
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In practice, one and the same methodological decision will very often affect the probability 
of arriving at a positive result and the likelihood of ending up with a negative one. 
Methodological decisions therefore typically involve a complex trade-off between the three 
risks of committing a false positive error, committing a false negative error and ending up 
without any result at all. In scientific practice, the reliabilities of positive and negative 
results are thus likely to be inter-dependent and affected by evaluations corresponding to all 
six of the utilities represented in figure 2. 
3. Methodological conventionalism 
We have seen that if epistemic reliance entails working from an assumption of reliability, 
there is a general difficulty involved in identifying the appropriate degree of reliability that 
may reasonably be assumed in each case—at least as long as methodological decisions are 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
no matter how inconclusive the evidence.) Nothing of substance depends on the latter presupposition, except 
that to do without it would require us to make some annoying case differentiations. 
11
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regarded as a matter of individual rationality. This is a potential threat to the efficient 
division of cognitive labor in the sciences. When reliability is underestimated in acts of 
reliance, results of others will be called into doubt too early, leading to an unnecessary 
duplication of scientific work. On the other hand, in cases of excessive reliance where 
reliability is overestimated, researchers will hold on to the results of others more 
persistently than is warranted, which will in some cases lead them into dead ends that could 
have been avoided. 
The problem of epistemic reliance is thus a problem of coordination. The difficulty is 
not that epistemic reliance in the sciences requires a particular, definitive degree of 
reliability either on the side of those who rely or on the side of those who provide the 
results that others rely upon. Rather, the social epistemology of the sciences requires that 
the reliability that producers of information aim at and the reliability that is presupposed in 
acts of epistemic reliance be suitably adapted to one another.  
In very general terms, the appropriate practical solution to a problem of coordination 
is a convention (Lewis 1969, ch. 1). In pursuit of this basic idea, I will now try to show how 
the social problem of epistemic reliance is in practice at least partly solved by means of 
conventional methodological standards. 
That there are some conventional standards in place that have a direct bearing on the 
problems at issue is easily illustrated. The most obvious example is perhaps the convention 
(which can be found in a whole range of scientific specialties) that .05 is the highest 
reasonable significance level in significance testing. If the stipulation was .04 instead, 
“significant” results would on the average be more reliable, but also more difficult to 
obtain. If it was .06, it would be the other way round. One would be hard pressed to argue 
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that .05 represents just the “best” choice for facilitating a socially organized cognitive 
endeavor. What is crucially important, instead, is that there is one level that is widely 
recognized and that thereby helps researchers to gauge their reliance on reports that 
communicate the finding of a “statistically significant effect”. 
However, the range of methodological standards that can be regarded as conventions 
in this fashion is much broader. As was mentioned before, all kinds of decisions about 
experimental setup, data analysis and interpretation affect the distribution of inductive risks. 
Many of these are constrained by methodological rules that are shared among the members 
of a research community: rules about what kind of controls a study should include, rules 
about what kind of precautions should be taken to causally isolate an experiment, rules 
about the conditions under which a set of data may be discarded, and so on.  
It may be thought that such rules cannot be regarded as conventional stipulations 
because they serve to increase the reliability of experiments and studies and are therefore 
not arbitrary (i.e., they are not really solutions to pure coordination problems). But the 
above considerations show that increasing the reliability of a method cannot be the one  
unconditionally desirable methodological aim—increasing the reliability of one kind of 
result will always come at a cost, usually the cost of an increased occurrence of 
investigations with no result (and possibly an increased risk of false negative errors too). 
Methodological standards must always strike a balance between reliability and power, 
where “power” signifies the rate at which a scientific investigation delivers definitive 
results.12 Which precise balance is struck will always be arbitrary to at least some extent. 
What is decisive however is that the methodological standards impose certain constraints 
                                                          
12
 This use of the term “power” is adapted from Goldman (1992, 195), where it is introduced to signify the 
rate at which a practice delivers true results (thus combining reliability and power in my sense). 
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on the balance, and that these constraints and the ways in which they are imposed by the 
standards are common knowledge within the research community.13  
Such conventional methodological standards facilitate epistemic reliance within 
science. A researcher learning about the result that a fellow scientist has reportedly 
achieved with the aid of a certain method will know the conventional standards pertinent to 
that method and have a sense of the balance between reliability and power that they strike. 
This knowledge will give her guidance—for example with regard to the question as to how 
long she should hold on to the reported result in face of recalcitrant experimental results of 
her own. 
How would we best describe the kind of assumption about other scientists’ results 
that researchers build into their plans and decisions in acts of epistemic reliance of the sort 
that is fostered by conventional standards? I submit that we should not regard it as a 
straightforward assumption about reliability. First of all, many standards implicitly set 
limits to a range within which the balance between reliability and power may be struck 
rather than directly determining one definite balance. Secondly, not all methodological 
decisions are standardized, nor can they be. The ever-developing practices of science will 
always force their practitioners to make choices (such as whether to try out some new 
experimental technique or not) that cannot be constrained by conventional standards (yet).14 
Both points indicate that the assumption at the focus of an act of reliance of the sort 
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 Common knowledge in the relevant sense requires that everybody knows and that everybody knows that 
everybody knows, such that the system of mutual expectations that typically characterizes convention can 
arise. Cf. Lewis 1969, 52-60. 
14
 If more reasons are needed, the relevance of skills and tacit knowledge for scientific practice could also be 
appealed to in order to support the claim that not everything in science can be standardized. 
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considered here is one that offers the relying researcher guidance on her assessment of the 
pertinent reliabilities rather than itself being an assumption about reliability. More 
precisely, it seems that what the relying scientist works into her plans and decisions is the 
assumption that the results she is relying upon were arrived at by means of professional 
methods suitably employed (where the precise meanings of these terms are determined by 
the conventional standards of the pertinent research community). In other words, the 
phenomenon at issue is reliance upon widespread observance of the rules of the trade. It can 
very plausibly be expected to provide a basic structure of epistemic reliance that plays a part 
in keeping the social-epistemic fabric of science together.15 
4. Trust in science 
But is the kind of reliance which is fostered by conventional methodological standards 
sufficient to facilitate division of cognitive labor as practiced in the sciences? We saw that 
the common knowledge about standards provides guidance for assessing the reliability of a 
result. But if standards often leave some maneuvering space for methodological decisions, 
and if some decisions are not standardized at all, how are researchers supposed to fill the 
gaps in their knowledge about how exactly the reported result came about in order to get an 
idea of its intended reliability? Recall that methodological decisions often occur deeply 
embedded in the research process and are often not made explicit in the published research 
literature (nor could they be, because the efficient division of cognitive labor does not 
                                                          
15
 My description of methodological conventionalism is intended to preserve the spirit of an idea that Isaac 
Levi succinctly articulated in response to Rudner’s problem: The values that determine the acceptable levels 
of inductive risk, Levi thought, might be considered part of the set of normative principles that a scientist 
commits herself to when she commits herself to “certain ‘scientific’ standards of inference”. (Levi 1960, 356) 
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permit arbitrary amounts of effort to be spent on communicating every last detail of the 
methodology).  
If not all the relevant methodological decisions are themselves transparent, then the 
only way of factoring in their import in a non-arbitrary way that remains open to those 
relying on a research result is to work from an estimation of the utilities in light of which 
the decisions are likely to have been made. In some contexts, for example, researchers 
might expect each other to make all their methodological decisions in a “disinterested” 
fashion, meaning that they ought to value all correct outcomes equally high (c = d) and all 
errors equally low (e = f, e ¥ c) and evaluate all states of ignorance on an even level 
somewhere in between (i = j, e < i < c).16 If all methodological choices are made rationally 
in accordance with these utilities (and are based on realistic assessments of the probabilities 
of S in light of various possible bodies of evidence) then one should expect the reliabilities 
of both positive and negative results to be equally high, because the investigation would be 
geared towards reporting S if and only if Pr(S) > t and reporting non-S if and only if Pr(¬S) 
> 1 – u, and under the restrictions described, t = 1 – u (see figure 3).17  
                                                          
16
 This is in effect the utility structure that Levi (1962, pp. 55-56) ascribes to a person seeking the truth and 
nothing but the truth. 
17
 The restrictions in question are not necessary for effective disinterestedness in the sense of t = 1 – u. 
Generally, t = 1 – u will hold as long as (i – f)/(d – j) = (j – e)/(c – i), which would also permit more “unequal” 
utility distributions such as d = 7; j = 6; e = 0; c = 6; i = 4; f = 1. 
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Figure 3            Figure 4 
This would mean that disinterested methodological decisions could not involve any trade-
off between the risk of false positive errors and the risk of false negative errors. It would, 
however, not prevent trade-offs against the probability of ending up without any result and 
would in that sense not determine how the balance between reliability and power is struck. 
In order to assess this additional dimension, one would have to make further assumptions 
about where exactly between c and e the relative value of ignorance i has been set. This, 
more precisely the ratio (i – e)/(c – e), might be called the degree of caution of the 
respective investigation.18 
Such a simple kind of “disinterested” utility structure will not always be the one that 
scientists expect each other to apply to their methodological decisions. Consider, for 
example, a toxicological investigation into the question of whether substance X poses a 
health risk to infants when used as a softening agent in plastic baby bottles. In such an 
investigation, given the particularly dreadful results that would ensue if substance X in fact 
                                                          
18
 Cf. Levi 1962, 56-57, who is well aware of this problem and introduces the term “degree of caution” for a 
value that is equivalent to our (i – e)/(c – e). 
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represented a major health risk to babies but our investigation failed to identify this risk, 
one may reasonably expect the utilities for i and f to be significantly reduced as compared to 
a purely academic investigation. The difference might be illustrated by the shift from figure 
3 to figure 4, which also makes intuitively clear that the specific circumstances would 
justify relaxing the projected reliability r for positive results but tightening the standard 1 – 
u for negative results.19  
To be sure, I do not mean to suggest that considerations about the consequences of 
their results justify scientists to take any methodological steps in defiance of existing 
conventional methodological standards. The above considerations are intended to pertain 
only to the kinds of methodological choices that are left open by the existing standards. 
Relying on blunt standards is arguably easier and less error-prone than relying on a shared 
sense of the appropriate value judgments and the latter may therefore provide only the 
second best solution to the problem of coordination. However, it is not practically feasible 
to standardize a complex real world practice down to the last detail, let alone a practice as 
innovative and ever-changing as science. 
With regard to the decisions that take place within the leeway that the existing 
standards thus always have to leave open, disinterestedness may sometimes be a feature of 
the utility structure that scientists expect to underlie each others’ choices, and sometimes 
not. Even where it is, this does not settle the question before an additional assumption about 
                                                          
19
 The choice of example should not mislead us to believe that disinterestedness will be the rule as long as no 
“external” factors come into play. Also purely “internal” considerations can lead to an asymmetrical 
distribution of utilities. For the systematic organization of our knowledge, for example, the value of 
confirming that a certain effect or phenomenon exists might be much higher than the value of ascertaining that 
it does not exist. 
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the degree of caution has been made. All this supports at least the following observation: 
Epistemic reliance in the sciences and thus the division of cognitive labor can be expected 
to work even more efficiently than on the basis of conventions alone if the scientists within 
a research community share certain value judgments. The value judgments in question are 
of course those that are reflected in the sets of utilities ascribed to the possible outcomes of 
the investigation. As we have seen, these are in effect value judgments about the benefits of 
correct results relative to the costs of incorrect ones.  
To be more precise, it is not strictly necessary that the researchers agree with each 
other in their honest personal value judgments. It suffices if the evaluations of possible 
outcomes that the information users assume the information producers to have taken as a 
basis for their methodological decisions and the evaluations that the latter have actually 
used are (approximately) the same. This presupposes only a shared sense of what the right 
evaluations would be. 
In this way there arises the possibility of an enhanced kind of epistemic reliance—
reliance based on the presumption of shared ideas about the values of true results and the 
dangers inherent in errors. This kind of reliance presupposes much more than just that other 
scientists work dependably and professionally in keeping with the rules of the trade. It 
presupposes that they have the right attitude towards what they are doing—an attitude 
whose absence might be considered not just regrettable but to a certain degree 
blameworthy. I therefore suggest that this enhanced kind of epistemic reliance would be 
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truly deserving of the name of epistemic trust. It is, after all, a kind of relying that makes me 
dependent on another’s working from the right value judgments.20 
The fact that it is theoretically possible to work assumptions about other people’s 
value judgments into my plans and decisions without actually sharing these value 
judgments might be taken to indicate that genuine epistemic trust in the above sense is not 
really required for the kind of coordination at issue. In theory, the coordination could even 
be successful on the basis of a set of value judgments that no-one really made, but that 
everyone just assumed to be the kinds of value judgments that are commonly expected and 
applied. But this way of achieving coordination, while theoretically possible, would in all 
likelihood suffer from a lack of stability. The coordination would break down as soon as it 
was discovered that the value-judgments were not widely held. Genuine epistemic trust is 
what makes the stable coordination of epistemic efforts practically feasible.21 
                                                          
20
 Obviously this does not exactly coincide with Baier’s (1986) initial analysis of trusting as the kind of relying 
that makes me dependent on another’s good will. But her conception (which is built around the good will of 
one trustee toward one trustor) cannot be transferred unchanged to the case of a collective enterprise bound 
together by trust, which is our present concern. In such an enterprise, it should also be possible that the “good 
will” (or a comparable kind of disposition) is toward the enterprise itself rather than toward its participators. 
An analysis of the difference between trust and mere reliance that may lend itself more easily to the collective 
case is Carolyn Mcleod’s (2000) suggestion that trusting is the kind of reliance that involves optimism about 
the trusted person’s moral integrity.  
21
 It might be objected that even if I do share someone's value judgments I can rely on them in a sober and 
calculating mode, without feeling let down if they fail to do as I expected. Would that not mean that my 
reliance need not amount to genuine trust? It would, if the affective response of feeling let down was a 
constitutive element of trust. I find it more convincing to see the decisive element in the particular kind of 
motivation that we assume to be at work in a person we trust – the kind that is rooted in her good will, or in 
her moral integrity. If such trust turns out to have been misplaced, to feel let down is a typical and perhaps 
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This assessment also fits well with another characteristic that has been used to set 
trust apart from mere reliance, namely its interactive component. When I trust, Philip Pettit 
has noted, I typically believe that making my reliance manifest to the trustee will strengthen 
her reasons to do that which I rely on her to do (1995, p. 206). Shared ideas about what the 
right evaluations of an inquiry’s outcomes would be, if they exist, can be expected to 
display exactly this kind of interactive element. The very fact that my peers rely on me to 
base my decisions on certain valuations would, once it becomes known to me, strengthen 
my reasons to do so. 
The question remains: Does the collective enterprise of science need the kind of 
coordination of value judgments that is facilitated by genuine epistemic trust to bind it 
together, or is mere reliance enough? One reason to think that genuine trust is required I 
have already mentioned. Not everything can be standardized, and thus the mechanism of 
reliance that is supported by methodological standards leaves too many gaps to facilitate a 
dependable assessment of reliabilities in and of itself. Lest these be filled by mere 
guesswork, assumptions about outcome evaluations must enter into the picture. 
But an additional reason should also be considered. It has to do with the other kind of 
trust in science, the trust that is invested in scientific results by those outside the scientific 
communities. The reliance of non-scientists upon scientific information often consists in 
them working from the assumption that science is a disinterested endeavor. Trade-offs 
between the risks of false positive and false negative errors might then be regarded as cases 
of bias and as a betrayal of the trust invested in science by the public. The topic is 
particularly sensitive if the potential real world consequences of false positive errors on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
natural reaction, and thereby indicative of this particular kind of reliance, but it is not required by the 
definition of “trust”.  
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one hand and false negative errors on the other would have to be borne by different 
parties—for example by consumers on the one hand and by producers on the other, or by 
developers on the one hand and by the public on the other (cf. Wilholt 2006, pp. 70-1). In 
some cases, however, the public may expect scientists to take exceptional care to avoid one 
of the two types of error—for example if that kind of error would have catastrophic 
consequences. Under such circumstances, non-scientists trust scientists to base their 
methodology on evaluations of the possible outcomes that, rather than being “disinterested” 
in the sense specified above, reflect the paramount interests of society at large. 
In either case, how can the scientific community do justice to the trust invested in it 
from without? Only by actually basing methodological decisions on the kinds of evaluations 
that the public expects them to be based on.22 As science is essentially a social enterprise, 
this requires the evaluations in question to pervade the research community. In order to 
achieve this pervasion, science needs a stronger mechanism than just conventional 
standards. It needs the interactive and value-infused instrument of genuine epistemic trust 
within the scientific community in order to be able to do justice to the trust it receives from 
without.23 As I assume that it is at least sometimes and in some respects desirable that 
                                                          
22
 By this I do not mean to imply that the scientific community should always evaluate the outcomes of 
inquiries in line with the public. If the public trusted scientists to come up with some refutation of 
anthropogenic climate change so that everyone can keep driving their SUVs with a calm conscience, that 
would not be a good reason for the climate scientists to relax their standards. Sometimes trust is better 
disappointed. The public may also trust a judge to send a certain man to jail, but if the man is innocent the 
judge had better set him free regardless. 
23
 In addition, the instrument of conventional standards would also have to be calibrated to accord with the 
evaluations that are supposed to pervade the whole enterprise. This would, perhaps plausibly, qualify their 
character as being “purely conventional”: While all kinds of stipulations striking all kinds of balances between 
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research communities strive to deserve the trust invested in them by the public,24 this 
constitutes another reason why science needs to be committed to epistemic trust and not just 
mere reliance. 
As above, my point is not that the expectations of the public give scientists an excuse 
to violate methodological standards. The preceding remarks are primarily directed at the 
kinds of decisions that are left open by the existing methodological conventions. However, 
they may also be of relevance for situations in which research communities settle on new 
standards. The distribution of inductive risks that is implicit in a new standard should 
correspond to the evaluations expected by the public, or else the public trust in science will 
be to a certain extend misplaced. 
I regard the arguments in this paper as independent from and complimentary to the 
reasons by which John Hardwig has supported the claim that cooperation in the sciences 
requires “trust in the moral sense” (1991, 702). Hardwig rests his case on the premise that 
the practices of peer review and replicating experiments are insufficient for the effective 
detection of fraud and other forms of misconduct. My reliance on other scientists’ good 
conduct can then not solely be based on my understanding that they act in their own long 
term self-interest (as Blais 1987 had argued). If fraud stands a good chance of passing 
undetected, my confidence that others nevertheless abstain from committing it constitutes 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
inductive risks could function as reliance-enabling and reliance-preserving, only a limited range of them would 
also count as trust-enabling and trust-preserving. 
24
 As I have tried to argue, there is no one set of evaluations of the possible outcomes of an inquiry that is 
“correct” or “properly scientific”. Using the ones which the public trusts science to use would therefore not 
interfere with the “inner logic” of the scientific enterprise. There are in fact many positive reasons for at least 
sometimes doing so—the most prosaic one being that science depends on the public's patronage for its very 
existence. 
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the kind of reliance that makes me dependent on another’s “character”, as Hardwig puts it. 
The arguments that I have discussed in this paper provide additional reasons for thinking 
that the collective cognitive enterprise of science has to be bound together by trust—reasons 
that would in my view remain convincing even if there was an effective self-regulatory 
mechanism for the detection of fraud and other forms of misconduct in place.25 
5. Conclusions 
I have argued that epistemic reliance in science sometimes has to take the form of working 
an assumption about others’ evaluations of the possible outcomes of an investigation into 
one’s plans. I have suggested calling this kind of reliance epistemic trust, because it is based 
on a shared sense of what the right attitude toward the aims of a collective epistemic 
enterprise is and on the confidence that other participants in the enterprise actually display 
that attitude. Perhaps nothing of substance depends on the terminological suggestion of 
calling this trust, although I do consider it justified by the extent to which the mutual 
expectations that this kind of reliance involves are likely to be normatively charged, which 
is a telling characteristic of trust. In Baier’s words: “[T]rusting can be betrayed, or at least 
let down, and not just disappointed.” (1986, p. 235) 
                                                          
25
 Hardwig’s influential and pioneering analysis presents epistemic reliance as a reliance on others’ sincerity, 
competence and justification (in the sense that they themselves have good reasons for the beliefs that they 
testify on) (1985 and esp. 1991, 699-700). I would argue that these elements alone do not suffice to describe 
the structure of epistemic trust in science, because they do not allow us to characterize assumptions about the 
balance between reliability and power and about the distribution of inductive risks. On the other hand, a 
notable similarity between Hardwig’s case and the one presented in this paper is that both contain an appeal to 
the tacit dimension, i.e. to the fact that in a collective epistemic enterprise not all the details that are relevant 
for the acceptance of a particular piece of information can be effectively communicated to every recipient of 
that information (cf. esp. Hardwig 1985, 338-339). 
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The substantial result of these considerations is the high degree to which the 
phenomenon of epistemic trust is infused with value judgments. One way of putting this is 
to observe that the apparently simple distinction between epistemic and other kinds of trust 
in science with which I began may be less clear-cut than it seems. If trusting someone in her 
capacity as information provider involves a reliance on her having the right attitude towards 
the possible consequences of her work, epistemic trust is likely to be intricately interwoven 
with general expectations regarding the scientist’s sense of responsibility. Trust in science, 
whether epistemic or otherwise, always involves a normative assessment of its aims and 
means.  
This, it should be emphasized again, does not undermine the venerable supposition 
that truth is the aim of inquiry, or that a consensus on aiming at the truth is important for 
every collective cognitive enterprise. Rather than saying too much about the social 
enterprise of science, as some critics of truth have maintained, the preceding observations 
show that such suppositions say too little. The right balance between reliability and power 
as well as the right balance between the risks of false negatives and false positives are 
underdetermined by the aim of truth. An integrated collective epistemic enterprise requires 
the general aim of truth to be supplemented by a more specific consensus on the benefits of 
getting it right and the costs of getting it wrong in each specific case.26 
 
 
                                                          
26
 Note that in my model, the general aim of truth is incorporated in the more specific valuations in form of the 
constraints f < i < c and e < j < d. 
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